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Abstract 
While there have been numerous studies on the role of state-controlled finance in the 
development era, it is still poorly understood how the credit allocation mechanism has 
evolved throughout the recent period of financial liberalization in Korea. This paper 
focuses on the financing mechanism of the investment spree observed in the pre-crisis 
episode and finds that the corporate financing pattern in the 90s is characterized with 
two notable features: first, the rising volume of non-bank financial intermediary (NBFI) 
intermediated credits – both direct borrowings and the NBFI related direct financing 
such as commercial papers, and second, the increasingly shorter maturity structure of 
corporate debts – both domestic and foreign. Those features were in fact deeply related 
with the nature of financial liberalization policies undertaken and reflected distorted 
incentives based on implicit government guarantee. Given that the mismanagement of 
required paradigm shift from traditional state-controlled financial system to a more 
market-based system has caused structural vulnerability for the economy, we can 
draw couple of policy lessons for developing economies from the Korean experience. 
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1. Motivation and Questions 
This paper studies the linkage between financial structure and economic performance in 
pre-crisis Korea. Given that efficient financial system facilitates economic development 
through efficient allocation of resources, it is necessary to focus on the evolution of 
resource allocation mechanism to explore the linkage between finance and growth. 
While numerous factors affect actual evolution path of financial structure, in Korea, it is 
essential to understand the dynamic relationship among the government, finance and 
commerce, which has critically affected overall risk and performance of the economy. 
 
<Figure 1> GDP Growth Rate and Fixed Investment / GDP in Korea 
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Figure 1 shows Korea’s real GDP growth rate and the share of total fixed 
investment out of GDP from 1960 to 2000. Carefully looking at the figure, we can 
observe three distinctive periods of relatively strong investment growth − late 60s, late 
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70s and the 90s prior to the crisis. As we discuss below, the period of 1961 to 1980 
corresponds to the period of nationalized banking system and hence, the first two 
investment booms were driven under the state-controlled financial system. There have 
been numerous studies on the role of the state-controlled finance in the development era 
of the Korean economy.1 However, it is still poorly understood how the resource 
allocation mechanism has evolved throughout the recent period of financial 
liberalization. More interestingly, the nature and financing mechanism of the third 
investment spree observed in the 90s has not yet been clearly understood, which is the 
main focus of the present paper. 
Given that the deterioration of corporate and financial sector balance sheets in the 
pre-crisis episode has provided a cause of the Korean economic crisis (Hahm and 
Mishkin (2000)), the present study focuses on the changing nature of credit flows to the 
corporate sector, mainly to large conglomerates known as chaebol, in characterizing the 
evolution of the financial structure in pre-crisis Korea. Specifically, throughout the paper, 
we try to provide answers to the following questions: 
- What are the implications of the early attempts at financial liberalization in the 
80s on the traditional risk partnership among the government, bank and 
chaebol? 
- How can we characterize the evolution of corporate financing patterns as a 
corporate sector’s endogenous response to the structural shift? 
- Did the financial liberalization and increasing independence of corporate firms 
in their financing and investment decisions contribute to the overall efficiency of 
credit allocation? 
- More specifically, how was the investment spree in the 90s financed and how 
did it affect the Korean economy in terms of risk structure and corporate 
profitability? 
                                                 
1 On the relationship between the role of finance and economic development in Korea, see Amsden 
(1989), Cho (1989), Lee (1992), Park (1993) and Cho and Kim (1997), among others.  
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- What factors led to the failure of financial liberalization policies in replacing the 
traditional state-controlled credit allocation mechanism with a more market-
based system? 
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section briefly reviews the formation 
and evolution of traditional risk partnership among the government, bank and chaebol in 
early development stages of the 60s and 70s. Section 3 describes attempts at financial 
liberalization in the 80s and the evolution of corporate financing pattern resulted from 
the structural shift. Section 4 focuses on the unusual investment behavior in the 90s and 
discusses how it was financed and what the implications were on the efficiency and risk 
for the Korean economy. Section 5 discusses major factors that have led to the 
misallocation of resources and structural vulnerability. Finally section 6 summarizes and 
draws policy lessons. 
 
2. State-Commerce Risk Partnership in the Development Era of the 60s and 70s 
The tripartite risk partnership among the government, bank and chaebol in Korea has 
been formed from early 1960s, when the military government led by Park Chung Hee 
nationalized commercial banks in October 1961. The subsequent period of nationalized 
banking system can be divided into two sub-periods depending upon the priority and 
nature of the government development policies. 
2.1. Export-led Economic Growth in the 60s and the 1972 Corporate Bail-outs 
The first sub-period corresponds to the 1961-1972 period, which was characterized by 
export-led development policies. During this period, the military government set the 
export-led economic growth as a supreme policy priority, and used mobilization of 
domestic saving and its allocation to strategic export sectors as essential tools of 
development. The government strengthened its control over the financial system by 
nationalizing commercial banks in 1961, subordinating the central bank to the 
government in 1962, and by establishing various specialized banks to handle policy 
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loans. In 1965, the government raised nominal interest rate on savings deposit in order to 
attract private saving into the banking sector from informal financial sectors, which also 
contributed to the increase in the scope of government control over the financial system. 
 
<Table 1> Export Credits of Deposit Money Banks 
                                                                        (%) 
 1961~65 1966~72 1973~81 1982~86 1987~91 
Share of Export 
Loans out of total 
DMB Loans 
4.5 7.6 13.3 10.2 3.1 
Interest Rate on 
Export Loans (A) 9.3 6.1 9.7 10.0 10~11.0 
Interest Rate on 
General Loans (B) 18.2 23.2 17.3 10~11.5 10~11.5 
(B)−(A) 8.9 17.1 7.6 0~1.5 0~0.5 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues; re-quoted from 
Financial Reform in Korea, Presidential Commission for Financial Reform, 1997 
 
 
The credit policies in this export-led growth period were characterized by the 
extensive use of export credit programs to finance strategic export industries. Loans 
were almost automatically extended to the export industries by commercial banks and 
the Bank of Korea (BOK) at heavily subsidized interest rates. As can be seen in Table 1, 
the interest rate differential between subsidized export loans and general loans reached a 
level of 17 % point on average during the 1966-72 period. The export credit programs 
were designed and implemented by close consultation with major exporters, and the 
government explicitly linked export performance with their access to this subsidized 
credit. 
The first sub-period ended up with a major financial debacle, the August 3rd 
Presidential Emergency Decree of 1972, which was designed to bail out heavily debt-
ridden corporate sectors. The burst of investment booms developed in the second half 
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of the 1960s and the tight monetary policy and devaluation imposed to cope with a 
large current account deficit resulted in the bankruptcies of foreign debt ridden 
corporate firms and piling up of non-performing loans. To cope with the corporate 
debt crisis, the government imposed a moratorium on debt services to curb market 
lenders and rescheduled bank loans at substantially reduced interest rates.2 
The August 3rd emergency measure deeply affected the Korean economy. As 
argued by Cho and Kim (1997), the fact that the corporate sector was bailed out at the 
expense of private curb lenders and bank depositors gave an important signal to the 
market that the government was in fact sharing major risks of the corporate sector. 
The materialization of the implicit insurance significantly aggravated moral hazard 
subsequently as the management of rescued firms and institutions were rarely 
punished. 
 
2.2. The Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive in the 1973-79 Period 
The second sub-period in the development era of the Korean economy corresponds to 
the 1973-79 period, which was characterized by more stringent interest rate controls and 
selective credit policies for heavy and chemical industries (HCI). From 1973 the 
government adopted policies promoting HCIs which required a large amount of long-
term financing, and strengthened directed credit programs to support the HCI drive. The 
government established National Investment Fund in 1974 to mobilize necessary long-
term financial resources, and the BOK expanded its rediscounts and enacted loan 
guidance to facilitate more commercial bank loans to the HCIs. Table 2 shows the 
imbalances in the resource allocation during the peak years of the HCI drive. While the 
share of HCIs in total manufacturing value added was less than 50% in 1978 the 
industry received nearly 60% of total bank credits, and more than 80% of all 
manufacturing facility investment was undertaken in the heavy and chemical industries. 
                                                 
2 All curb market loans and approximately 30% of short-term bank loans were swapped into long-term 
loans with interest rate cap of 16.2%, when the curb market rates were over 40%. (Kim (1990)) 
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 <Table 2> Resource Allocation during the HCI Drive 
                                                                        (%) 
Share of Heavy & Chemical 
Industries in Total Manufacturing 
1976 1977 1978 
Value Added 46.8 48.5 48.8 
Bank Credit (DMB & KDB) 54.2 56.4 59.5 
Facility Investment 74.2 75.4 82.5 
Source: Re-quoted from Nam (1984) 
 
 
The HCI drive and the reversion to low interest rate policies reinforced the 
government-chaebol risk sharing scheme. The policy loans and credit controls may have 
contributed to the rapid industrialization by assuring private firms to undertake risky 
investments with positive externalities. However, the government partnership also raised 
problems of moral hazard for chaebols and financial institutions. Firms became 
increasingly dependent upon funds with subsidized interest rates and their financial 
structure deteriorated. Commercial banks neglected credit evaluation and monitoring, 
and consequently, the non-performing loans increased substantially. 
Another important feature of the financial development in this period is the 
formation of formal non-bank financial sectors. In a form of institutional reform in the 
wake of the August 3rd decree, Investment and Finance Company Act and Mutual 
Savings and Finance Company Act were legislated to absorb informal curb market 
lenders. Also the Merchant Banking Corporation Act was legislated in 1975 to expedite 
foreign capital inflows. Note that the government encouraged establishment of non-bank 
financial intermediaries (NBFIs) and lenient regulations were applied in order to absorb 
informal financial sectors into formal financial system and partially to compensate for 
the losses incurred by the informal sector under the 1972 emergency measure. 
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 3. Evolution of Bank Credit Flows and Corporate Financing Pattern in 1980-1993 
Notwithstanding its contribution to industrialization, the extensive use of credit 
restriction as a primary tool of development resulted in a distorted financial system. 
Recognition of the problems associated with the state-controlled development policies 
such as the over-capacity in the heavy and chemical industries and the unbalanced 
growth of large firms relative to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) led the 
government to adjust its financial policy toward less credit controls and liberalization of 
the repressed financial sector. 
First major attempt toward financial liberalization was the re-privatization of 
commercial banks from 1981. The negative experience in the 1950s led the government 
to maintain the principle of separation between commerce and finance in privatizing 
commercial banks.3 The separation of commerce from the banking system was to insure 
financial soundness and avoid possible conflict of interests, however, it also left a 
possibility that the government continue to influence corporate investment decisions 
through commercial banks. Indeed, while the bank ownership was transferred to the 
hands of private sector, the practice of government intervention and indirect controls 
over bank credit allocation continued. 
The government also strengthened bank credit control system in the 80s.4 The 
credit control system was formally incorporated into the revised Banking Act in 1982, 
and the Office of Bank Supervision was vested with the authority to set a ceiling on the 
share of chaebols in any bank’s loans. The bank credit controls were mainly to stem 
concentration of economic power and to ensure access of SMEs to bank credits. Bank 
                                                 
3 The Banking Act amended in December 1982 introduced an explicit ownership regulation that any 
individual or corporate cannot own more than 8% of total shares issued. 
4 The bank credit control system was initially introduced in 1974 to improve the capital structure of 
chaebol by encouraging them to use more direct financing. Public listing in the stock market was also 
encouraged to stem concentration of corporate ownership. These policies, however, were not actively 
enforced during the 70s. See Yoo and Lim (1999) for the detailed discussion of chaebol policies in 
Korea. 
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credits to chaebol were tightly controlled to ameliorate the problem of loan 
concentration, and in 1987, the basket credit control system was introduced to directly 
limit the shares of bank loans to the 30 largest chaebols. Note that the shift in the 
government policy and regulatory environment implied that the traditional bank-chaebol 
relationship was also changing in this period. The structural shift in the 80s indeed 
brought about quite substantial changes in the pattern of bank credit flows and corporate 
financing. 
First, the availability of bank credits for chaebol was gradually limited as the 
government redirected policy priorities and strengthened bank credit control system. 
Table 3 indicates that throughout the late 80s and early 90s SMEs received increasing 
share of commercial bank loans while chaebol received decreasing shares. Note that 
both the basket control limits and actual shares of top 5 chaebol in bank loans dropped 
substantially in 1989, indicating that chaebols increasingly needed alternative sources of 
financing. 
 
<Table 3> Share of Deposit Money Bank Loans to SMEs and Chaebols 
                                                                        (%) 
Loan Shares 1988 1989 1990 1991 
SMEs 48.1 50.1 55.5 56.8 
Top 30 Chaebols 23.7 20.7 19.8 20.4 
Top 5 Chaebols 
(Basket Limit) 
12.7 
(15.2) 
7.2 
(8.6) 
6.6 
(7.2) 
5.8 
(5.8) 
Source: Bank of Korea, Office of Bank Supervision and Presidential Commission for 
Financial Reform (1997) 
 
 
The second notable feature that can be observed in the 80s is the emergence of 
NBFIs as an increasingly important sector of the Korean financial system. Figure 2 
shows the composition of non-securities financial saving in Korea. Even if we exclude 
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certificate of deposit (CD) and money trust account of commercial banks from the 
NBFIs, the share of NBFIs increased rapidly and accounted for more than 50% of 
financial saving from mid 80s, while the share of commercial bank account decreased 
steadily from nearly 60% in 1980 to 26.8% in 1990. The emergence of the NBFIs and 
increasing ownership of them by chaebol imply that faced with tight control of bank 
credits, the NBFIs emerged as an important alternative financing source for chaebol.5 
 
 
<Figure 2> Composition of Financial Saving 
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Also during the 1980s, with the advances in financial liberalization, capital 
markets were deregulated substantially increasing the availability of direct financing for 
corporate firms. Table 4 shows trends in the composition of financial liabilities (in 
balances) in the corporate sector. Note again that borrowings from the NBFIs increased 
                                                 
5 Different from the banking sector, no outright ownership regulation was applied to the NBFIs. In the 
absence of transparent entry requirements, discretionary issuance of licenses on occasional basis 
resulted in the increasing ownership of NBFIs by chaebols. For instance, during the 1988-93 period, 22 
new life insurance companies were established and many of them were owned by chaebols. Also from 
late 70s to mid 80s, 31 investment finance companies were established and 19 were owned by 
chaebols, and as for the securities companies, 11 were already owned by chaebols as of the end of 
1981. 
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substantially during the 80s and the share exceeded borrowings from the banking sector 
by early 90s. Note also that the shares of commercial papers and corporate bonds 
outstanding were increasing substantially in the late 80s, which indicates that direct debt 
financing had become another important source of financing for the corporate sector by 
early 90s. Also note that during this early liberalization period the share of foreign 
borrowing decreased steadily. 
 
 
<Table 4> Composition of Financial Liabilities in Korean Corporate Sector 
(Based on balances) 
                                                                        (%) 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 
Borrowings from 
Financial Institutions 19.4 23.6 32.2 35.8 36.5 37.0 
Banks 14.8 17.2 20.7 19.7 18.7 17.8 
NBFIs 4.6 6.5 11.5 16.0 17.8 19.2 
Securities Issued 37.5 23.1 21.3 27.2 35.9 39.0 
CPs 0.0 0.6 2.0 2.6 4.8 5.3 
Corporate Bonds 0.3 0.7 3.5 7.2 11.0 13.4 
Stocks 37.2 21.7 15.0 16.4 18.3 16.5 
Foreign Borrowings 10.5 15.3 15.0 9.4 5.5 4.1 
Others 32.6 37.9 31.4 27.6 22.1 20.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: Others include government loans and trade credits among corporate firms.  
Source: Bank of Korea, Understanding of Flow of Funds in Korea, 1994 
 
 
The overall evidence in this section indicates that initial attempts at financial 
liberalization during the 80s and early 90s implied a structural weakening of the 
traditional risk partnership between the government and chaebol. While the government 
retained controls over bank credit allocation by tightening credit regulations, corporate 
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financing behavior also evolved in response to the structural shift, and the NBFIs and 
domestic capital markets emerged as important financing vehicles by early 1990s. This 
structural change implied that chaebols were gaining increasing degree of independence 
in their major investment decisions.6 
 
4. Investment Spree in the 90s and Corporate Performance 
As emphasized in the introduction, an important objective of the present study is to 
understand the nature of unusual investment behavior in the 90s focusing on its 
implications on the risk and efficiency for the Korean economy. Figure 1 above 
indicates that there has been a major investment spree in the 90s, which lasted up to the 
onset of the 1997 financial crisis. The share of fixed investment out of GDP was above 
35% during the period, which was unusually high from both the historical standard and 
international standard.7 
The high investment rate itself could not be a problem as long as the capital 
invested is used in productive investment since it will contribute to future economic 
growth. However, the high investment rate may reflect misallocation of resources if the 
investment were driven by distorted incentives in the absence of appropriate monitoring. 
Note also that, depending upon the nature of its financing scheme, the investment boom 
could lead to major structural vulnerability for both the corporate sector and financial 
system. 
Let us first investigate the financing aspect of the investment spree. Figure 3 
shows the trend of corporate sector financial deficit and external funds raised during the 
90s. It clearly indicates that the financial deficit has been mainly financed by external 
funds rather than internal funds. Table 5 shows more detailed sources of the external 
                                                 
6 For more detailed discussion on the evolution of tripartite relationship among the government, 
chaebol and bank , see Hahm (2000). 
7 The average fixed investment ratio during the 1991-95 period was 36.7% in Korea, while the ratio 
was 15.7% in U.K, 16% in U.S. and 29.7% in Japan. 
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financing during the period. 
 
<Figure 3> Corporate Sector Financial Deficit and External Funds Raised 
(Trillion won, in current prices) 
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<Table 5> Structure of Corporate Financing in Korea 
(External financing, based on flows) 
                                                                        (%) 
 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Indirect finance 39.7 36 40.9 41.8 36.3 32.8 44.5 31.8 31.3
Borrowing from banks 30.2 20.8 16.8 19.8 15.1 13.7 20.7 14.9 15.7
Borrowing from NBFIs 9.5 15.2 24.1 22.0 21.1 19.0 23.8 17.0 15.6
Direct finance 15.1 22.9 45.2 37.9 41.4 53.3 38.1 48.1 47.0
Commercial paper 0 5 4 -3.8 7.6 14.7 4.9 16.1 17.5
Corporate bonds 1.1 6.1 23 24.2 12.5 15.0 14.2 15.3 16.9
Stocks 13.9 10.9 14.2 15.1 15.9 16.5 14.8 14.4 11.3
Foreign borrowings 29.6 16.6 6.8 4.4 5 -2.3 4.9 8.4 10.2
Others 15.6 24.5 7.1 15.9 17.3 16.2 12.4 11.7 11.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Others include government loans and trade credits among corporate firms. 
Source: Bank of Korea, Understanding of Flow of Funds in Korea, 1994 
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Relative to the 70s and 80s, the financing pattern of corporate firms in the 90s can 
be characterized as follows. First, as emphasized before, the NBFIs continued to be an 
important source of indirect financing in this period. The share of NBFI borrowing has 
been consistently bigger than the share of bank borrowing. Second, direct financing 
became more important source of financing in the 90s and this was mainly due to the 
increasing shares of commercial paper and corporate bonds rather than equity financing. 
Note that the share of commercial paper increased sharply in 1995 and 96, which 
reflects that not only the corporate balance sheet structure deteriorated in the 90s due to 
the growing volume of external financing, the maturity structure of corporate debt also 
deteriorated. Indeed, Table 6 shows that both the mean debt-equity ratio and median 
short-term debt ratio increased steadily during the 90s. Finally, it is also worthwhile to 
note that the share of foreign borrowing increased rapidly in the 1994-96 period 
reflecting the acceleration of financial market opening, which indicates that the 
corporate sector became increasingly exposed to currency fluctuations.8 
 
<Table 6> Leverage and Short-term Debt Ratio of Korean Listed Firms 
 
                                                                        (%) 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Debt-Equity Ratio 
   (mean) 282 264 310 322 337 364 353 378 355
Short-term Debt Ratio 
(median) 44.3 52.8 50.2 50.2 55.8 56.3 58.6 59.6 58.5
Source: Claessens, et al. (2000) 
 
 
                                                 
8 Hahm and Mishkin (2000) indicated that the exposure of corporate sector to foreign exchange risk 
constitutes an important crisis propagation mechanism in emerging market countries. They found that 
at least 60% of corporate sector foreign currency debt in Korea was not hedged prior to the 1997 crisis. 
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Then how was the corporate sector performance in the 1990s? A closer look at the 
corporate sector profitability reveals that the chaebol and whole corporate sector 
suffered from decreasing profitability from early 1990s. Table 7 shows return on assets 
of the Korean corporate sector and indicates that the profitability picture was clearly 
deteriorating in the 90s relative to the late 80s. Note that the recovery of the return for 
top five chaebols in the 1993-95 period was mainly due to the semiconductor booms, 
and hence, the lower profitability in the 90s seems to be a structural decrease. The 
structural decrease in corporate sector profitability implies that the efficiency of 
investment undertaken may have been deteriorating in the 90s relative to the 80s.9 
 
<Table 7> Return on Assets of the Korean Corporate Sector 
 
(%) 
 1987-89 1990-92 1993-95 1996-97 
All Firms 6.41 3.53 2.06 -0.73 
Chaebols 3.93 2.41 1.77 -0.01 
1-5 chaebols 4.42 2.38 2.62 0.95 
6-10 chaebols 1.98 1.57 0.84 -0.70 
11-30 chaebols 4.75 2.98 1.73 -0.29 
Independent Firms 6.98 3.75 2.12 -0.88 
Small & Medium Firms 6.52 2.68 0.69 -3.82 
Source: Lee (2000)  
 
 
5. Factors that led to Misallocation of Resources and Structural Vulnerability 
                                                 
9 For example, Hahm (2000) reported a structural increase in the incremental capital-output ratio 
(ICOR) in Korea in the 90s relative to the 80s indicating that the aggregate investment efficiency may 
have been deteriorating in the 90s. For more direct micro-evidence on the efficiency of credit 
allocations in pre-crisis Korea, see Borensztein and Lee (1998). Borensztein and Lee (1999) also 
argued that credit appears to have been reallocated in favor of more efficient firms after the 1997 crisis 
relative to the pre-crisis episode. For chaebols’ investment behavior in the pre-crisis period, Hahn 
(1999) reported evidence that chaebols in fact preferred riskier businesses anticipating loss protection 
from the government. 
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Above discussions imply that the efficiency of credit allocation may have been 
deteriorating throughout the 90s especially for chaebols. Given that the investment spree 
in the 90s has not been driven by the state-controlled commercial banks as in previous 
investment drives of the 60s and 70s, an important question arises: what factors were 
behind the corporate financing pattern of the 90s, which led to structural vulnerability 
and misallocation of resources? We must clarify those factors to understand why 
financial markets failed to monitor investment behavior of the corporate sector, 
especially that of chaebols. Note again that notable features of the credit allocation in the 
90s were first, the rising volume of NBFI intermediated credit flows through either 
direct borrowings or NBFI intermediated direct financing such as commercial papers, 
and second, the increasingly shorter maturity structure of corporate debts – both 
domestic and foreign. Those features are in fact deeply related with the nature of 
financial liberalization policies and reflect distorted incentives of market participants 
based upon implicit government guarantee. 
 
5.1. Unbalanced Financial Liberalization and Increasing Vulnerabilities 
Financial liberalization did play an important role in increasing structural vulnerabilities 
of the financial system in Korea. As noted by Hahm (2000), in retrospect, the financial 
liberalization program in Korea revealed quite an unbalanced and asymmetric nature. 
The first asymmetry came from the unbalanced interest rate regulation across 
commercial bank and non-bank financial industries. NBFIs were allowed much greater 
freedom in their management of assets and liabilities and, most crucially, were permitted 
to apply higher interest rates on their deposits and loans. As shown in Table 8, relatively 
large deposit interest rate differentials across commercial banks and investment finance 
companies persisted until mid 90s. The deregulation of interest rates on non-bank 
financial products, while effectively controlling commercial bank deposit rates, 
contributed to the rapid expansion of NBFIs throughout the 80s and 90s. 
The emergence of NBFIs magnified financial risks for the entire financial system 
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because, first, the NBFIs were not adequately supervised as commercial banks, and 
second, as noted by Lee et al. (2000), interest rates on short-term NBFI intermediated 
instruments such as commercial paper were deregulated first. Rapidly growing 
commercial paper markets led to shortening of corporate debt maturity and duration 
mismatches for NBFIs. The unbalanced financial liberalization exposed corporate and 
financial sectors to substantial liquidity risks. 
 
<Table 8> Average Interest Rates on Deposits 
 
                                                                        (%) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Commercial Bank 
Time Deposits 
 (6 mon-1 year) (A) 
6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 7.0-9.0 9.3 13.9 
Investment Finance Co. 
Cash Management 
Account (180 days) (B) 
15.0 15.5 11.9 12.9 13.3 11.8 12.6 
(B) − (A) 9.0 9.5 6.9 7.9 4.3-6.3 2.5 -1.3 
Note: Investment and finance companies were transformed to merchant banking corporations 
in 1994-96. 
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin, various issues 
 
 
The second asymmetry came from the unbalanced deregulation of capital 
accounts, which was accelerated in post 1993 period. In 1993, the Korean government 
expanded list of usage for which financial institutions could provide foreign currency 
denominated loans. Short-term foreign borrowing by financial institutions was allowed 
while the government maintained quantity restrictions on long-term foreign borrowing. 
The unbalanced nature of capital account liberalization also caused rapid increase in 
short-term external debt ratio and exposed both corporate and financial sectors to 
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substantial foreign exchange liquidity risk.10 
 
5.2. Dominance of Chaebol over NBFIs and the Legacy of Government Risk Partnership 
Relatively high returns on the NBFIs’ financial products apparently contributed to the 
expansion of non-bank financial industries. However, had the high returns also involved 
high risks, the expansion of NBFIs would not have been so dramatic. The second 
important factor was the fact that, at least in ex-ante sense, the risk associated with the 
NBFIs may not have been so high. The ex-ante low risk was deeply related with the 
dominance of chaebols over NBFIs and the implicit government insurance extended to 
chaebols and financial institutions. 
While the influence of chaebol over NBFIs had been increasing from the 1980s, 
its dominance was culminated at the onset of the financial crisis. As of the end of 1998, 
70 largest chaebols owned 140 NBFIs, which is approximately 30% of the whole 
NBFIs.11 The dominance of chaebol, especially in the absence of effective supervisory 
and monitoring scheme, brought about serious conflict of interest problems. In fact 
many of the NBFIs fell down to private cash vault for chaebol with the outbreak of the 
financial crisis. Lenient supervisory standard and poor monitoring practices resulted in 
various incidents of illegal and unfair activities where funds of affiliated financial 
institutions were exploited for ailing subsidiaries.12 
Note also that the legacy of government guarantee based upon that chaebols are 
too-big-to-fail has been pervasive in the financial market. As can be seen in Table 9, 
while both the profitability and capital adequacy of the NBFIs affiliated with chaebol 
                                                 
10 The short-term external liability ratio in Korea increased from 58.8% in 1992 to 65.8% in 1994 and 
65.7% in 1995. 
11 The total number of NBFIs at the end of 1997 was 487 excluding leasing companies. 
12 Kim (1999) provides evidence on the negative consequence resulted from the ownership of 
financial institutions by chaebols. Using micro data on corporate and financial firms from 1990 to 
1997, Kim found that, controlling other variables, chaebols who owned NBFIs borrowed 
systematically more at lower borrowing costs compared to firms that did not own NBFIs. Kim 
interpreted this as evidence of unfair fund flows to affiliated companies. 
 18
were systematically lower compared to the independent NBFIs, the market share of 
chaebol-owned NBFIs increased steadily. This observation implies that not only credit 
allocations of chaebol-owned NBFIs were less efficient, but also that the incentive of 
financial market participants was severely distorted and there were no effective market 
monitoring mechanism. 
 
<Table 9> Market Share, ROA and Capital Adequacy of Chaebol Affiliated NBFIs 
 
Market Share of Top 5 Chaebol affiliated NBFIs 
Out of Total NBFI Deposits 
1997.3 
18.6% 
1998.3 
29.6% 
Return on Assets of NBFIs (accounting year 1997)
Chaebol affiliated
-0.47 
Independent 
-0.37 
Capital Adequacy of NBFIs (1998.3) 
Merchant Banks BIS Capital Ratio 
Security Co. Net Operating Capital Ratio 
Chaebol affiliated
5.4 
164.7 
Independent 
6.3 
234.2 
Source: Kim and Lee (1999) and Kim (1999) 
 
Then, why had the government allowed dominance of chaebol over NBFIs and 
pursued financial liberalization in such an unbalanced manner? It is possible that policy 
makers in the initial financial liberalization period had not been fully aware of the 
potential problems. However, the government in the 90s seemed to recognize the 
potential risks.13 Notwithstanding the recognition, the government policy was often 
captured by the interest group. As noted above, faced with the shift in the traditional 
relationship, chaebol was looking for an alternative source of financing which was not 
                                                 
13 According to the ‘New Economy’ blueprint of the Kim Young Sam government released in July 
1993, the government planned to introduce explicit ownership regulations to non-bank financial 
industries and tried to reinforce financial supervision to minimize potential negative consequences of 
the dominance of chaebol. Political pressures may have played a non-trivial role behind the fact that 
this policy plan was not subsequently implemented. See Hahm (2000) for more detailed discussions of 
the political economy aspect of financial liberalization process in Korea. 
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subject to government control. As argued by Lee, et al. (2000), the unbalanced financial 
liberalization may have resulted from the endogenous response of chaebol who had 
actively lobbied to increase the scope of NBFIs and liberalize their related businesses 
first. 
 
6. Policy Lessons and Concluding Remarks 
Given that mismanagement of the paradigm shift from traditional state-controlled 
resource allocation mechanism to a more market-based system has caused structural 
vulnerability of the Korean economy, we can draw couple of policy lessons from the 
Korean experience. 
In the management of paradigm transitions, three factors seem to be important. 
First, it is critical to break off the legacy of implicit government insurance extended 
in the development era. The distortion of incentives based on the expectation of future 
bailout causes significant misallocation of resources for the economy. In this regard, 
early resolution of insolvent corporate firms and financial institutions is critical. To 
minimize regulatory forbearance, it is also important to have a politically independent 
supervisory system and the accountability of supervisory authority needs to be 
strengthened. 
Second, the Korean case highlights the importance of strengthening financial 
supervision over the non-bank financial industries. As in commercial banking 
industry, prudential regulations such as prompt corrective action need to be 
introduced and strictly applied. To cope with the conflict of interest problem resulting 
from the ownership of NBFIs by corporate firms, it is also critical to strengthen 
governance scheme and monitoring mechanism for the NBFIs. Dynamic fit and 
proper test should be applied to large shareholders for their qualification and internal 
monitoring mechanism such as compliance and external director systems needs to be 
strengthened. If it takes time to upgrade supervisory and governance practices, 
temporary introduction of explicit ownership regulation should be considered. 
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Finally, financial liberalization needs to be designed carefully and implemented in 
a more orderly and systematic manner. It is important to have a transparent and clear 
liberalization agenda so that political influence could be minimized. The importance of 
strengthening prudential supervision while pursuing liberalization cannot be overstated. 
Financial institutions should be adequately capitalized by the global standard, and the 
risk management capability of both financial institutions and corporate firms needs to be 
upgraded with capital account liberalization. The risk implication of detailed 
liberalization measures should be carefully probed before actual implementation. 
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